Abstract: Political scientists, analysts and journalists alike have for long believed that the degree of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy determines voter turnout. In this article, we use survey data from 24 panel studies and demonstrate that the causal relationship is actually reversed: voter turnout affects satisfaction with democracy and not the other way around. We also show that this reversed relationship is conditioned by election type, electoral system, and election outcomes. These findings are important since: a) They question conventional wisdom and a large body of scientific literature; b) They invite a more nuanced approach in the study of the relationship between evaluations of regime performance and political participation; c) They underline the central role of elections in shaping citizens'
Introduction
"Does a low election turnout indicate voters are disillusioned or content?" asked one of the world's oldest newspaper The Herald in the run-up to the 2003 election to the Scottish Parliament (The Herald 2003, 12) . In its article, the Glasgow-based broadsheet comes to the conclusion that some abstainers may "register their disillusion" while others may be "content with the way things are". Interestingly, as we review below, this intuition reflects the current state of the scientific debate on the impact of citizen's satisfaction on voter turnout.
Nevertheless, the title is illustrative of yet another phenomenon. More broadly, it shows how pundits usually conceptualize the relationship between satisfaction with the way democracy works and voter turnout: the former as the cause and the latter as the effect. However, such a view is incomplete since there are theoretical reasons and empirical findings for considering the presence of a reversed relationship. In this article, we use data from 24 panel studies and debunk the conventional wisdom. We find no evidence of the effect of democratic satisfaction on voter turnout but robust support for the reversed relationship. In other words, voter turnout tends to affect satisfaction and not the other way around. In national and subnational elections, the effect is positive and it is stronger in majoritarian electoral systems and among voters who think that their preferred party won the election. Conversely, in supranational elections, the effect is negative and affects the whole electorate.
Hypotheses
Satisfaction with democracy is best understood as an indicator of regime performance, situated between more diffuse support for political community and regime principles and more specific support for regime institutions and political actors (Norris 1999 , Linde and Ekman 2003 , Norris 2011 , Linde 2012 . As regards its impact on voter turnout, the political science literature has been divided in two camps (Pacek et al. 2009; Ezrow and Xesonakis 2014) . On the one hand, especially in earlier works, nonvoting is often seen as a sign of satisfaction with the current state of affairs (e.g. Tingsten 1930 , Wilson 1936 , Lipset 1981 . On the other hand, especially in the more recent literature, "dissatisfaction with democratic performance is usually regarded at least implicitly, as an important cause of civic disengagement" (Norris 2011 ; see also Kostadinova 2003) . Both perspectives agree on the direction of causality and assume that one's perception of the overall functioning of the political system motivates the decision to vote or abstain. Political scientists, thus, frequently use satisfaction with democracy to predict voter turnout (e.g. Grönlund and Setälä 2007; Flickinger and Studlar 2007, Hadjar and Beck 2010) .
Hypothesis 1a: Satisfaction with democracy decreases voter turnout.

Hypothesis 1b: Satisfaction with democracy increases voter turnout.
Most empirical studies employ post-election measures, or study macro-level data using measurements from non-electoral surveys. The two methods are problematic. First, the macro-data approach can provide only indirect evidence of the causal mechanism. Secondly, the post-election type of measurement implicitly presupposes that the election itself has not altered citizens' level of democratic satisfaction. Such presupposition is questionable.
Elections are at the heart of contemporary democracy (Dahl 1971; Huntington 1991) .
They are the principal means of changing the political course of a democratic polity. It is through elections that an unpopular incumbent can be voted out of office and replaced by a more popular alternative. They represent the most tangible embodiment of the democratic principle to which citizens are regularly and systematically exposed. It would be surprising if elections had no effect on citizens' view about how democracy works in their country. We hypothesize that, in most circumstances, elections boost satisfaction with democracy, especially among voters who play the democratic game.
Hypothesis 2: Electoral participation increases satisfaction with democracy.
However, the impact of electoral participation is likely to vary across contexts and individuals. With regard to the former, an increase in satisfaction can be expected only as long as there is a clear link between election outcomes and government composition. A quintessential example of elections where such a link is tenuous are supranational elections to the European Parliament. Although they are run essentially as national contests on national issues (Reif and Schmitt 1980) , a party winning the national vote may end up in the losing camp at the supranational level. Furthermore, the European Union's institutional structure and operating mechanisms further hinder accountability (Follesdal and Hix 2006) . Consequently, the positive effect of elections on satisfaction should be weak or inexistent in EP elections. On a more general level, following Aarts and Thomassen 2008, we expect that elections under majoritarian electoral rules allow for more accountability and, therefore, boost satisfaction with democracy more strongly than elections using proportional representation. 
Hypothesis 4: The positive effect of electoral participation on satisfaction is stronger in majoritarian electoral systems
As for individual-level variations, it is obvious that election outcomes are not equally liked or disliked by all voters. Citizens' preferences presumably condition election-related change in satisfaction. Winners, i.e. those who prefer the party (or parties) that won the election, are likely to see their satisfaction increase much more than losers, i.e. those who prefer the losing alternatives.
Hypothesis 5: Satisfaction with democracy increases the most among election winners.
The impact of elections and election outcomes on mass political attitudes has been studied empirically by a vibrant strand of political science literature. These studies have generally found that those who participate in an election consider the outcome of the election as more legitimate than abstainers (Nadeau and Blais 1993) and that winners become more satisfied than losers (Anderson et al. 2005; Henderson 2008; Singh 2014; Campbell 2015; Singh and Thorton 2016) . Although these studies provide valuable insights, they suffer from the same limitation as the aforementioned research since they are based on the same kind of data -post-electoral surveys. They consequently do not allow researchers to control for preelection attitudes. As for panel studies, they are rare, usually cover a single election and often study different, typically more specific, types of political support. They have found that voting in elections increases external efficacy (Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978) and perceptions of legislators' responsiveness (Clarke and Kornberg 1992) . Those effects tend to be the strongest among election winners, who also become more trustful of government (Anderson and LoTempio 2002) and less cynical about political parties (Banducci and Karp 2003) . In terms of satisfaction with democracy, a positive effect has been detected in the 1999 legislative election in New Zealand (Banducci and Karp 2003) in the 2010 North Rhine-Westphalia election (Singh et al. 2012) Respondents were asked, generally one week before and week after the given election, to indicate their degree of satisfaction with democracy at the election-related level of governance.
They were proposed a 0-10 scale where 0 means "not satisfied at all" and 10 "very satisfied". 3 We divide the scale by ten so that it varies between 0 and 1.
The control variables are the classic predictors of electoral participation commonly used in political science research such as age, education and political interest (Blais 2007, see the Electronic Appendix for descriptive statistics). It should be noted that all the control variables were measured in the pre-election surveys while the main variable of interestreported electoral participation -was measured after the election. Hypothesis 3 and 4 are tested by dummy variables that distinguish different types of elections (national, subnational and supranational) and different electoral systems (majoritarian and proportional). As for Hypothesis 5, we introduce two dummy variables that ascertain whether voters think the party for which they had cast a vote won or lost (abstainers and don't knows are the reference category). 4 Finally, all the of the following analyses include region (or election-region) dummies.
Findings
In Table 1 , we present the results of four analyses. Model 1 regresses electoral participation on the pre-election and post-election measures of satisfaction with democracy alone. 5 In conformity with Hypothesis 2, the post-election measure is much more strongly associated with voting than the pre-election one. At this stage, it cannot, however, be excluded that pre-election satisfaction, the coefficient of which is also positive and statistically significant, fosters voting too as Hypothesis 1b suggests. Therefore, in Model 2, we test the pre-election measure alone while incorporating the control variables. The coefficient is now even smaller than in model 1 and no longer meets the most lenient threshold of statistical significance. This means that the weak positive effect of the pre-election measure in Model 1 was essentially a proxy for variables that are more closely related to voter turnout such as education or interest in politics. People who are dissatisfied with democracy before the election do not participate less because they are dissatisfied but because they are less educated or uninterested in politics. In contrast, the effect of the post-election measurement in Model 3
is still substantial and meets the most rigorous threshold of statistical significance.
Furthermore, the findings from Models 2 and 3 are confirmed in Model 4 where the two measures are tested jointly with the control variables. While the post-election measure remains statistically significant, the pre-election measure changes sign and is insignificant. All the models point in the same direction: conventional hypotheses (1a and 1b) are rejected while the first alternative hypothesis (2) is supported. increases. If we did not have the pre-election measure, we would conclude that a shift from no satisfaction to maximal satisfaction increases the probability of voting by approximately five percentage points. This is a large effect, which would provide strong evidence for the conventional interpretation (Hypothesis 1b). We know, however, that turnout is related to post-election satisfaction and not to pre-election satisfaction, and thus that it is voting that boosts satisfaction and not the other way around. 
Figure 1 Predicted Probability to Vote and Satisfaction with Democracy
The impact of voter turnout on satisfaction with democracy is formally tested in Table   2 . The dependent variable is the change in satisfaction with democracy between the preelection and post-election measurements. The main predictor of interest is turnout. To take into account ceiling effects, we control for pre-election satisfaction. The result clearly corroborates Hypothesis 2: having voted increases satisfaction with democracy by 0.02 (0.2 on the 0-10 scale) among voters when compared to abstainers (the reference category). To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we added election type and electoral system as predictors in the model presented in Table 2 . Each variable was also interacted with voting. We plot the effect of these variables as average marginal effects in Figure 2 and 3. 6 . They express the predicted change in satisfaction with democracy for voters and abstainers in different institutional contexts.
In terms of election types (Figure 2 ), national and subnational elections increase voters' satisfaction by approximately 0.03 while exerting no effect on abstainers. Conversely, supranational elections to the European Parliament depress satisfaction in the whole electorate by practically the same amount. This validates and even exceeds the expectations of Hypothesis 3. It suggests that EP elections expose the democratic imperfections of the European Union and, instead of boosting democratic satisfaction, they decrease it.
Figure 2 Predicted Pre-Post Change in Satisfaction with Democracy by Election Type
Given the peculiarity of supranational elections, in the remaining analyses, we focus on national and subnational elections. 
Figure 3 Predicted Pre-Post Change in Satisfaction with Democracy by Electoral System
Finally, we examine the impact of perceptions of election outcomes. Figure 4 shows that, as predicted by Hypothesis 5, the effect is much stronger among election winners. Those who believe that their preferred party won the election see their satisfaction increase by 0.09 (0.9 on the 0-10 scale). Nevertheless, a substantially small but statistically significant increase is observable also among election losers. This reveals that elections tend to legitimize democracy among all voters and not only winning parties' supporters.
Figure 4 Predicted Pre-Post Change in Satisfaction with Democracy among Voters Conclusion
This article questions the conventional view about the causal relationship between satisfaction with democracy and electoral participation. What is thought by many to be the cause is in reality the effect and vice versa. This finding has important implications.
First, the results of earlier studies, based on post-electoral surveys, need to be reinterpreted. In light of our findings, those prior works do not testify to the impact of satisfaction on voting but, instead, to the impact of voting on satisfaction. There is no evidence that those who are less satisfied before the election vote less.
Second, our analysis contributes to the broad literature on the role of elections in democracies. It provides robust support for the legitimizing effect of elections. We show that, in national and subnational elections, especially those run under majoritarian rules, voting increases the satisfaction of all voters -even those who lost the election -and that it strongly boosts the satisfaction of those who believe that they won the election. In that respect, the generalized boost in satisfaction with democracy resembles the honeymoon effect, which also affects both election winners and losers (e.g. Brody 1991) . Future studies should investigate to what extent the two phenomena are related and whether the election-driven boost in satisfaction with democracy is as temporary as the honeymoon.
There are certainly circumstances in which citizens can become less satisfied after an election. In this study, we found that supranational elections decrease satisfaction both among voters and abstainers. Such a negative effect can be expected in other contexts in which elections produce outcomes that are seen as distorted, illegitimate or ineffective, and it may affect especially those who voted for parties that fail to gain any representation (Blais et al. 2015) . For instance, in the U.S. context, satisfaction may decrease among those voters whose preferred presidential candidate loses the White House despite winning the popular vote like the Democrats in 2000 and 2016 (see Craig et al. 2006 ). More generally, future research should explore in greater detail how contextual factors such as disproportionality or party system fragmentation condition the effect of elections on citizens' satisfaction.
Third, our findings underline the pitfalls of using satisfaction with democracy measured in post-electoral surveys to predict voting behaviour. These attitudes are likely to be affected by the election itself. The causal arrow may go in the other direction: from voting behaviour to attitudes.
Fourth, our results remind us that elections are a central democratic institution. In retrospect, it seems obvious that elections affect how citizens perceive the functioning of democratic regimes. This does not rule out the possibility that other factors such as political scandals may produce strong shifts in satisfaction with democracy (Kumlin and Esaiasson 2012) . The bottom line, however, is that elections matter and that, most of the time, participating in an election makes citizens more satisfied with the way democracy works.
